This paper investigates how financial market experts perceive the interest rate policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). Assuming a Taylor-rule-type reaction function of the ECB, we use qualitative survey data on expectations about the future interest rate, inflation, and output to discover the sources of individual interest rate forecast errors. Based on a panel random coefficient model, we show that financial experts have systematically misperceived the ECB's interest rate rule. While the perception of monetary policy regarding inflation has become more accurate since the clarification of the ECB's monetary policy strategy in May 2003, the experts' misperception regarding the ECB's reaction to output has increased in the financial crisis.
Introduction
Central bank communication is increasingly important to both central banks and financial market participants, see Blinder, Ehrmann, Fratzscher, DeHaan, and Jansen (2008) . Effective communication should ensure that financial markets understand the central bank's interest rate policy, i.e., how interest rate decisions are linked to future inflation and output. However, central bank communication is not always effective and interest rate forecast errors can, and do, occur for two reasons. First, forecasters may indeed understand monetary policy but misperceive future interest rate decisions simply because they are wrong about future inflation and output. Second, the forecasters actually do not understand monetary policy and the interest rate rule applied by the central bank. In this case, communication should be improved because markets will misperceive interest rate decisions even under perfect information about the economic outlook. This paper employs survey data on financial market expectations about future interest rates, inflation, and output in the Euro area to shed more light on communication by the European Central Bank (ECB), disagreement among financial experts over future interest rate decisions, and the sources of policy misperception.
Our analysis employs individual interest rate forecasts by financial market experts taken from the Financial Market Survey conducted by the Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW). It is a monthly survey and comprises a rich set of qualitative expectations on short-term interest rates, inflation, and output. Assuming that experts use Taylor-rule-type forecast equations for short-term interest rates, we explore whether interest rate forecast errors are driven by uncertainty about the future course of inflation and output or whether experts are confused about monetary policy rules.
In particular, we assess the consequences of a major change in ECB communication that occurred in May 2003. At this time, the ECB provided a more precise definition of price stability (inflation should be below but close to 2%) and deemphasized the role of monetary aggregates for short-term policy decisions. Since then, the ECB's monetary analysis has put more emphasis on the long-term relationship between money supply and inflation. We also investigate whether the market's understanding of monetary policy has been affected by the recent economic crisis.
Survey data on expectations are increasingly used in the literature to evaluate the effects of central bank communication. For example, Capistrán and Ramos-Francia (2010) and Ehrmann, Eijffinger, and Fratzscher (2010) explore how the introduction of inflation targeting affects the dispersion of inflation expectations in surveys. Lange, Sack, and Whitesell (2003) , Swanson (2006) , Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2007) , and Sturm and de Haan (2009) derive from survey data that more transparent communication generally improves market participants' predictions of the central bank's interest rate decisions.
All these contributions focus on the size and other statistical properties of individual forecast errors; no attempt is made to explain why interest rate forecast errors are made. A work by Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) is closest in spirit to the approach we undertake here. The authors investigate the role of geography, i.e. the forecaster's location, in interest rate forecast errors. By estimating Taylor-rule-type relationships for each forecaster separately, they decompose forecast errors as being either systematic or unsystematic. The present paper extends this approach in two ways. First, our analysis of experts' interest rate forecast errors includes information of the individual forecasts about inflation and output. Second, we analyze the determinants of the individual interest rate forecast errors by a panel random coefficient model which accounts for both the panel structure of the survey data and the heterogeneity of forecasters. In order to disentangle the sources of individual forecast errors, we estimate how heterogenous financial experts perceive the interest rate rule of the central bank. Recently, Hamilton, Pruitt, and Borger (2011) used a similar Taylor-rule-type model to investigate the perception of U.S. monetary policy. Based on the response of Fed funds rate futures to macroeconomic news, they estimate a market-perceived monetary policy rule and, thus, abstract from forecaster heterogeneity. In contrast, our empirical approach accounts for the disagreement between financial experts over the monetary policy rule and the economic outlook.
Our empirical results show that financial market experts tend to overestimate the ECB's interest rate reaction to inflation in the early years of the euro. However, the clarification of the ECB's monetary policy strategy in 2003 actually improved communication regarding the role of inflation. Following a counterfactual analysis, the major source of experts' interest rate forecast errors have been their own mistaken inflation forecasts and not the misperception of the ECB's response to actual inflation.
In contrast, the assessment of experts about the central bank's reaction to output growth has become less accurate over time. Since the beginning of the financial crisis, the misperception of the role of output for the ECB's interest rate decisions has explained a significant part of the experts' interest rate forecast errors.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the ZEW financial market survey data and briefly discusses how recent work has used the aggregate survey balance statistics versus the individual survey expectations. Section 3 derives and decomposes interest rate forecast errors from a standard Taylor rule. Section 4 presents the econometric model. Section 5 sets out the empirical results on misperception of the ECB interest rate policy and Section 6 concludes.
The ZEW Financial Market Survey

The Data Set
Since December 1991, the ZEW has regularly asked approximately 350 financial sector professionals about their expectations regarding a large set of macroeconomic variables, such as inflation, output, and interest rates. These professionals, or "financial market experts", usually have an academic background in economics and are also engaged in observing economic developments. Hence, they should be highly qualified for forecasting economic developments. Around half of them work at banks (60%); the rest are employed by the insurance industry (10%), financial departments of industrial companies (11%), or by other financial service providers. A majority (88%) of these financial market experts are employed in Germany, 10% are located within the European region, and 2% are from non-European countries.
Usually during the first two weeks of a month, the financial market experts are asked whether they expect short-term interest rates to decrease (-1), stay constant (0), or to increase (1) within the next six months. Specifically, the experts are asked for their predictions of the three-month interbank rate, i.e., the three-month Euribor in the euro zone, which is very closely related to the ECB's policy rate. In particular, assuming equal qualitative changes of the Euribor and the ECB's policy rate is empirically well established, see e.g. Nautz and Offermanns (2007) . Further survey questions relevant to this study concern changes in the annual inflation rate and the economic situation in the Euro zone. We evaluate the experts' answers to these questions with respect to the six-month changes in HICP inflation and in the yearly growth rate of industrial production, respectively. Table 1 
Balance Statistics and Forecaster Heterogeneity
The ZEW publishes aggregate balance statistics, defined as the difference between the relative share of answers falling into the categories "increase" and "decrease". Balance statistics of the ZEW survey are typically found to have reasonable forecasting properties, compare Nolte and Pohlmeier (2007) . The analysis of aggregate balance statistics already indicates that financial market experts keep a sharp eye on cen-tral bank communication. Ullrich (2008) showed that the balance statistics of ZEW inflation expectations respond significantly to ECB announcements.
Restricting the attention to the behavior of aggregate balance statistics does not fully exploit the information contained in the distribution of individual forecasts. In particular, forecaster heterogeneity should not be ignored when exploring how central In the following, we adopt the random coefficient approach. This approach captures the disagreement among experts over the central bank's monetary policy rule in the estimated distribution of random coefficients.
Sources of Interest Rate Forecast Errors
Interest Rate Forecasts and Taylor Rules
Most of the relevant studies on the accuracy of forecasts make no attempt to explain the sources of interest rate forecast errors. In an exception to this trend, Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) 
The Interest Rate Policy of the Central Bank
Ever since Taylor's (1993) seminal work, reaction functions specified as Taylor rules, where the central bank determines the key policy rate in response to inflation and output, have been the predominant way of modeling interest rate setting by central banks.
Starting with Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1998) , much empirical work confirms that
Taylor rules are remarkably adept at describing central bank interest rate decisions (for recent examples, see Jansen and de Haan (2009); Grammig and Kehrle (2008) ).
In accordance with Berger, Ehrmann, and Fratzscher (2009) and Hamilton, Pruitt, and Borger (2011) , we assume that the central bank sets the short-term interest rate in response to contemporaneous inflation and output:
The Taylor rule is defined in terms of semi-annual differences (∆ 6 i t = i t −i t−6 ) because the survey data refer to interest rate changes over six months. From a theoretical point of view, the output gap should be part of the Taylor rule. However, by taking differences, potential output drops out of the equation.
Decomposing Individual Forecast Errors
If the central bank follows a Taylor rule, financial market experts may also use a Taylor rule in formulating their expectations of the central bank decision. Given the survey horizon of six months, an expert j is expected to form his interest rate expectations in t − 6 for period t according to the following Taylor-rule-type forecast equation
According to Equation (2), the interest rate change expected by expert j depends on his expected change in inflation ∆ 6 π e jt and output ∆ 6 y e jt . 2
The interest rate forecast errors e i * jt are obtained by subtracting the financial market expert's forecast (Equation (2)) from the actually observed interest rate set by the central bank (Equation (1))
where the asterisk in e i * jt is used to be consistent with the latent variable formulation of the econometric model in Section 4. To derive the financial market experts'
2 Contemporaneous Taylor rules can be viewed as problematic because reliable data for current inflation and output is typically not available in that month and therefore the interest rate decision cannot depend on them. In our application, however, this is less of an issue because the expert's interest rate forecast depends on its own expectations about inflation and output. misperception regarding central bank parameters, Equation (3) is rewritten as:
with e π * jt = ∆ 6 π t − ∆ 6 π e jt and e y * jt = ∆ 6 y t − ∆ 6 y e jt . Equation (4) shows that the overall individual interest rate forecast error can be decomposed into two parts. The first part (α j e π * jt + β j e y * jt ) follows from the error a financial market expert makes in forecasting inflation and output. The second component ((α − α j )∆ 6 π t + (β − β j )∆ 6 y t ) is due to the analyst's misperception of how the central bank will react to changes in inflation and output. The central bank can influence both sources of error. First, it can provide the public with macroeconomic projections and, second, it can explain how it reacts to changes in these variables.
Qualitative Forecast Errors
The answers of the surveyed experts are qualitative, whereas the actual, observed data series is continuous. One way of making the two comparable is to transform the aggregate shares of responses into a quantitative series. Nardo (2003) critically reviews the prevailing quantification methods and concludes that they do not prove superior to the original, qualitative data. In order to ensure that our results will not depend on the applied quantification method, we decided to transform the quantitative interest rate data into a qualitative variable. For x = i, y, π, we therefore transform the semiannual differences of the actual time series (∆ 6 x t ) into the corresponding qualitative variable ∆ 6 x q jt as follows:
where ∆ 6 x j and ∆ 6 x j denote individual lower and upper thresholds, which have been surveyed within a special question in the ZEW survey. 3 Within these -partly asym-metrical -thresholds, a financial market analyst would continue to say that the underlying macroeconomic variable will not change. It is worth noting that due to different individual thresholds the qualitative variable ∆ 6 x q jt may actually depend on the expert. For example, some experts will interpret a small increase in inflation (∆ 6 π t > 0)
as significant (∆ 6 π q jt = 1) while others with higher thresholds may find the same increase to be negligible (∆ 6 π q jt = 0).
After these preliminaries, the qualitative forecast errors e x jt of expert j are derived as:
Note that the qualitative forecast errors can assume integer values from −2 to +2. For example, e x jt = +2 occurs if the actual value of x significantly increased (+1) while the expert expected it to decrease (-1). Accordingly, |e x jt | = 2 describes the worst case that even the directional forecast of expert j has been incorrect. The descriptive statistics on the resulting qualitative interest rate forecast errors, provided in Table 2 , show that the mean value of the forecast error e i is close to zero.
Moreover, they always range between -1 and +1. Therefore, at least the directional interest rate forecasts of experts have always been correct. Table 2 shows that the interest rate forecast errors of experts as derived from the ZEW survey are qualitative variables with three ordered outcomes. To explore the determinants of the errors, estimating an ordered logit model is a natural choice.
The Econometric Model
Panel Random Coefficient Ordered Logit Model
In line with the decomposition of an expert's interest rate forecast error derived in Equation (4), we estimate the following econometric model for the latent variable e i * jt for expert j, j = 1, ..., N , in month t, t = 0, ..., T j :
where e x jt = ∆ 6 x q t −∆ 6 x e jt measures the expert's forecast error for inflation and output. 
where ς 1 is a threshold parameter for the probability categories.
To measure dispersion of the forecasting models across the financial market experts, we estimate a random coefficient model according to Swamy (1970) . Under this approach, we incorporate cross-sectional heterogeneity of the perceived model coefficients. Cross-sectional heterogeneity in Equation (7) is introduced via the random coefficients α j , β j and γ x j . Specifically, the random coefficients are specified as follows:
with ξ α j , ξ 
The ECB's Clarification of the Monetary Policy Strategy
Given the economic interpretation of the mean and dispersion parameters of the random coefficient model for the experts' interest rate forecast errors, we are particularly interested in how these parameters respond to ECB communication or to the financial market crisis. To that aim, we estimate our model for three different sub-periods. The first two sample periods are chosen according to changes in the ECB's communication.
The ECB made two announcements with respect to monetary policy strategy. In the first, in October 1998, 4 the ECB declared that its strategy would consist of three elements. Price stability, the primary objective, would be achieved with inflation rates of below 2%. Money would play a prominent role in assessing the risks to price stability and the outlook for price stability would be based on a broad assessment. In May 2003, 5 the ECB released the second statement on the monetary policy strategy. It contained two major elements. First, the ECB gave a more precise numerical definition of price stability, i.e. inflation rates should be less than, but close to, 2%. Second, by classifying money as a means for cross-checking the risks to price stability, the role of money in its short-term interest rate policy was de-emphasized. 
The Perception of the ECB's Monetary Policy Rule by Financial Market Experts
Evidence from a Panel Random Coefficient Ordered Logit Model
The estimation results for the determinants of the experts' qualitative interest rate forecast errors are summarized in Table 3 . We considered three different sample Table 3 shows that the perception of monetary policy has not been constant over time.
While the coefficients of inflation have decreased monotonically, the output coefficient is particularly small and even negative (-0.11) in the second sample period. This indicates that the clarification of the ECB's monetary policy in May 2003 contributed to de-emphasizing the role of output for the experts' interest rate forecasts. In fact, experts assume the ECB to put more weight (ᾱ >β) on price stability compared to output stabilization before the crisis. The relative importance of inflation decreased during the financial crisis when experts attribute to the ECB a higher output weight relative to inflation. (7)) is estimated. Standard errors in parentheses. Pseudo R 2 = 1−LL1/LL0 with LL1 being the unrestricted log-likelihood obtained in the respective estimation and LL0 the log-likelihood of a model restricted to a constant. N denotes the number of individuals. All estimated Taylor rule coefficients and dispersion measures presented are significant at the 5-percent level. Estimation by simulated maximum likelihood with 250 Halton draws, see Section A.2.
The middle part of Table 3 For the sake of comparison, we will look at the relative change in probabilities. For experts, the perception of ECB policy by experts from Frankfurt improves over time with respect to inflation and deteriorates with respect to output during the financial crisis. 
measures the relative change in the predicted probability for a correct interest rate forecast if expert j had correctly perceived the ECB's response to inflation. The larger the increase in that probability the larger the effects of a further improvement of central bank communication regarding its attitude towards inflation. We perform this exercise for all experts and for each of the different sources of policy misperception. π jt = 0) denotes the relative change in predicted probability of a correct interest rate forecast if the inflation error is set to zero compared to the actual error. Accordingly, ∆P (e i jt = 0|γ π j = 0) gives the relative change in probability if an expert has a perfectly correct perception of the ECB's reaction to inflation compared to the estimated misperception, see Equation (10). The same reasoning applies to the output variables. The table presents the averages of individual predicted probabilities in each sample period. Table 4 summarizes the results of this counterfactual analysis. For each sub-period, the first column of the table reports the model prediction for the average probability of a correct interest rate forecast, i.e.P (e i jt = 0). Note that the predicted probabilities are very close to the actual relative frequencies of the interest rate forecast errors, compare Having clarified the weight of inflation in its Taylor rule, the remaining task of the ECB's communication is to enhance experts' ability to forecast future inflation.
The improved perception of the role of inflation in the ECB's Taylor rule is confirmed for the period of the financial crisis. In fact, the effect of a correct perception of the ECB's inflation coefficient (γ π j = 0) on experts' interest rate forecasts remains small (1.5%). The larger effects of experts' forecasts for inflation (17.1%) and output (-26.0%) may reflect the increased uncertainty about the economic development during the crisis. Note that interest rate forecasts of experts would even have been impaired by correct forecasts for output because experts have strongly misperceived the ECB's response to output during the crisis, compare Table 3 . In contrast, a correct perception of the monetary policy reaction to output would have increased the probability of a zero interest rate forecast error by 15.4%.
The counterfactual analysis indicates that the misperception of the ECB's interest rate policy shown in Table 3 is not only statistically but also economically significant.
Both the improved communication about the role of inflation in the ECB's Taylor rule and the drastic increase in misperception of the role of output in the financial crisis have considerable effects on experts' interest rate forecasting ability.
Conclusions
There is a growing consensus among economists and central bankers that expectations 
A.2 Estimation by Simulated Maximum Likelihood
The econometric model presented in Section 4.1 is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood. In the following, we sketch the estimation method and explain why the standard maximum likelihood procedure is not possible in the case of random parameters. For convenience, we first rewrite the random parameters of Equation (9) 
Since ξ j is unobserved, it has to be integrated out of the conditional log likelihood ln L|(z j , j = 1, ..., N ) =
with f (ξ j ) being the joint density, in our case the standard normal, of the elements in ξ j . However, the log likelihood in Equation (A2) has no closed form solution.
Consequently, we approximate the expected value of the log likelihood by a simulationbased integration, which replaces the unobserved vector ξ j by a simulated vector ξ j,r .
The simulated log likelihood for a number of R draws is computed as
Advancing on the standard approach of using random draws from the specified distribution, simulations based on Halton draws considerably speed up the estimation.
Halton draws are drawn from a deterministic sequence which is efficiently spread over the unit interval. Therefore, the simulation error associated with a given number of draws is reduced considerably and a smaller number of draws is needed compared to
